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Turbo Codes for Secret Key Generation in
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Gregory Epiphaniou, Member, IEEE Petros Karadimas, Member, IEEE Dhouha Kbaier Ben Ismail, Haider
Al-Khateeb, Ali Dehghantanha, Senior Member, IEEE Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The physical attributes of the dynamic vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) propagation channel can be utilised for the generation of
highly random and symmetric cryptographic keys. However, in a physical-layer key agreement scheme, non-reciprocity due to inherent
channel noise and hardware impairments can propagate bit disagreements. This has to be addressed prior to the symmetric key
generation which is inherently important in social Internet of Things (IoT) networks, including in adversarial settings (e.g. battlefields).
In this paper, we parametrically incorporate temporal variability attributes, such as three-dimensional (3D) scattering and scatterers’
mobility. Accordingly, this is the first work to incorporate such features into the key generation process by combining non-reciprocity
compensation with turbo codes. Preliminary results indicate a significant improvement when using Turbo Codes in bit mismatch rate
(BMR) and key generation rate (KGR) in comparison to sample indexing techniques.
Index Terms—Turbo codes, Social IoT Networks, Secret Bit Extraction, Key Generation Rate, Internet of Military Things, Internet of
Battlefield Things.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
CONVENTIONAL cryptographic solutions in wirelesscommunications generate shared secrets using pre-
computational techniques or asymmetric cryptographic pro-
tocols [1]. However, the challenges of generating such secret
keys are compounded due to other competing require-
ments such as energy efficiency, and the need to minimize
computational complexity and processing-communication
overhead, particularly in autonomous communication of
Internet of Things (IoT) nodes and social IoT networks
[2]. In recent literature, there have been efforts to extend
data sharing for different types of traffic in vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communications, in both civilian and military
context (e.g. Internet of Military Things and Internet of
Battlefield Things) [3]. Human social network infrastruc-
tures and subscription services are now available to sensors,
where the establishment and exploitation of social relation-
ships among them is completely transparent to the users
or their owners [4], [5]. This necessitates the re-design of
existing data networks, based on a new network paradigm
to maximise security and reliability. However, these are
challenging issues due to vehicle mobility in Vehicular Ad
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Hoc Networks (VANETs). Unsurprisingly, smart vehicles
are the objects of SIoT interactions building relationships to
enhance the driving knowledge and provide a wider range
of the services to the drivers.
Existing cryptographic solutions are designed indepen-
dently to the physical properties of the network in which
they are applied. This has initiated research activities in the
area of fast and efficient key generation algorithms based on
physical layer characteristics, such as those based on broad
Received Signal Strength (RSS) and frequency selectivity
[6], [7], [8]. In these approaches, the wireless channel acts
as a medium to increase key generation rate, cryptanalysis
resilience, and quality of keys generated between end points
due to the inherent stochastic nature of wireless propagation
channels [9]. In addition, the ability to generate crypto-
graphic keys using these approaches removes the reliance
on higher-layer encryption protocols. These “channel-based
key” extraction approaches seek to exploit the physical
properties of wireless channels, such as reciprocity and
temporal/spatial variability, in an attempt to provide the
necessary randomness for symmetric key generation [10],
[11].
In a typical VANET environment, the wireless links
between nodes and co-existent adversaries experience un-
correlated channel attributes. Therefore, these channels can
offer a certain degree of confidentiality during the key gen-
eration process between parties. Thus, this reduces compu-
tational complexity and eases key management. Secret key
information is usually generated from one or more channel
characteristics as part of the signal quantisation phase. How-
ever, the process to determine appropriate channel metrics
to characterise a unique wireless channel still remains a chal-
lenging and complex domain of scientific inquiry [12], [13].
2V2V Communication
On-board 
Unit 
(OBU)
On-board 
Unit 
(OBU)
TPM/Sensors TPM/Sensors
Road Side Unit (RSU)
V2I Communication
subscription 
Services
Data 
Servers
Certificate 
Authorities
Communication Services
( Fog /  Cloud Computing )
Social 
Networks
Fig. 1. Vehicular Networking Architecture
A trade-off also exists between quantisation performance
and selection of thresholds with a direct impact (positive
or negative) to the key generation rate. The unification of
the shared secret key must also adhere to error correction
principles and valid processes around privacy enhance-
ment techniques in order to minimise information leakage
during message exchanges. This process assures symmetric
operation between peers and confidentiality by minimising
information exchange during the process of correcting bit
mismatch between transceivers. This is especially important
in social IoT networks, due to the autonomous nature of the
nodes exchanging private information.
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to incor-
porate all essential V2V communication characteristics, such
as three-dimensional (3D) multipath propagation and sur-
rounding scatterers’ mobility (i.e. other vehicles), in the key
generation process. Our key generation technique can be
used to establish secure communication channels within ad
hoc social vehicular networks. We employ the comprehen-
sive parametric stochastic V2V channel model presented in
[14] to synthetically generate the receiver’s channel response
(Bob’s channel), where the transmitter’s response arises
after applying the non-reciprocity compensation technique
presented in [15]. After the necessary thresholding is used to
allocate bits according to designated signal levels, we apply
turbo coding (TC) techniques for information reconciliation.
At the time of this research, this is the first application of TC
techniques in such a setting (V2V channels with parametric
3D multipath propagation and scatterers’ mobility). We
report significant improvement in certain key performance
indicators (KPIs), in comparison to existing standard index-
ing technique described in [16]. To ensure a fair comparison,
the particular indexing technique was again applied in con-
junction with the non-reciprocity compensation technique
in [15]. More specifically, the key generation rate (KGR) and
bit mismatch rate (BMR) are significantly improved when
combining both non-reciprocity compensation and TCs in
our work.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
2 reviews existing works in secret key extraction focusing
on error reconciliation techniques. In Section 3, we briefly
present the performance metrics employed in similar works.
In Section 4, we present the adopted key generation process
by applying TCs and non-reciprocity compensation in V2V
communication channels incorporating 3D multipath prop-
agation and scatterers’ mobility. A comparative summary is
also presented. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
In VANETs (See Fig.1), nodes are distributed and self-
organised with the majority of wireless communication
carried out by on-board units (OBUs) integrated with addi-
tional services and processes running [17]. High mobility of
these nodes and propagation mechanisms of vehicular chan-
nels render these environments susceptible to faster fading,
multipath delay, path loss and increased Doppler frequency
shift. These unique temporal and spatial properties can
generate significant randomness in secret-bit extraction and
key distribution because channel responses are reciprocal
between two end points. Also, the prediction of randomness
in these dynamic environments is more difficult than static
ones due to the high entropy bits extracted in shorter time
[18]. Different approaches have been published in secure
key extraction protocols with different strengths and lim-
itations with regards to entropy, secret bit extraction rate,
key generation rate, number of nodes and threat models.
For an exhaustive comparison of these protocols, readers
are encouraged to see work in [19].
2.1 Challenges in secret key generation
The secret key information is usually generated from one
or more channel characteristics as part of the signal quan-
tisation phase, including fluctuations of signal amplitudes
and channel phase [20], [21], [13]. A trade-off exists be-
tween quantisation performance and selection of thresh-
olds with a direct impact (positive or negative) to the
key generation rate, entropy and bit mismatch rate. These
metrics can be affected by the time difference between
channel estimates at Alice and Bob, channel decorrelation
in time (channel coherence time), inherent communication
noise and hardware impairments [22]. The unification of
the shared secret key must also adhere to error correction
principles and valid processes around privacy enhancement
techniques in order to minimise information leakage during
message exchanges. Specifically in V2V communications
very high temporal variability takes place due to mobility
of transmitter, receiver and surrounding scatterers [14], [23],
[24]. Though disadvantageous for communication purposes,
such temporal variability can be readily exploited in the
key generation process. Signal strength variations due to
dynamically changing environments have been leveraged
in secret key extraction in [25], [26]. Authors have demon-
strated certain degree of entropy in the key generation and
exchange process under the assumption that an adversary
has unbounded capacity to estimate RSS values of the
packets transmitted. In [27], authors introduced a filtering
technique promised to maintain entropy and improve signal
correlation between communication parties by restricting bit
generation only for the period of time that that high motion-
related fluctuation is present. Movement characteristics and
3their influence in RSS variation have also been exploited
for key generation in [22], [28]. The correlation between
the probing rate and key generation rate was observed in
[29]. Authors introduced an adaptive probing scheme that
dynamically changes the probing rate subject to channel-
related parameters.
2.2 Secure key generation strategies
Authors in [30] positively correlate entropy of secret bits as
a function of mobility with high secret-bit extraction rate.
A single channel observation can lead to lower average
number of secret bits generated whereas the authors in [31]
model the upper bound of the average secret key extraction
rate as a function of the signal bandwidth. Most of the
approaches rely on the assumptions that Eve cannot jam
the communication channel and is not close to either Alice
or Bob.
Additional challenges have been recorded when RSS is
used as a metric to be quantised [15]. Typical thresholds
selected usually do not account for points in between them
thus reducing the overall key quality or information avail-
able for the key generation process. In addition, RSS is
usually extracted by a single frequency resulting in low
bit generation rates. On the other hand, channel-phased
quantisation presents several benefits as higher level of
secrecy can be achieved by the uniform distribution of the
phases on the channel taps and increase key generation rate
by leveraging the whole channel impulse response (CIR)
[19]. It is also noticed that a higher number of secret bits
can be extracted that removes the need to estimate RSS over
a certain time window. RSS-based approaches though do
not require significant hardware modifications with better
overall performance in respect to synchronisation errors.
The CIR can be described as follows [9]
h(t) =
L−1∑
i=0
hlδ (t− tl) (1)
where δ(.) is the impulse delta function, L is the number
of channel paths, hl is the l-th path complex gain and tl
is the delay of the signal on the l-th path in the mul-
tipath channel. The multipath fading channel properties
in frequency domain have also been investigated in the
literature as an alternative way to achieve high entropy and
key generation rate. Channel state information extracted
from OFDM subcarriers has been also introduced in an
attempt to reduce random noise and improve overall key
generation rate [15]. Multiple thresholds are also used to
further quantise these average values of channel response
to generate a binary sequence. That bit sequence is then
normalised through error reconciliation techniques to assure
symmetric and identical bits within the key space. Although
this approach is generic, applies more on static nodes and
does not depend on mobility aspects making it suitable for
wireless sensor networks. A further challenge would be the
violation of orthogonality due to Doppler effect inherent in
VANETs [32].
Authors in [15], argue that channel state information
extracted within the coherence time of the channel could
be non-reciprocal due to different electrical properties of
wireless devices including antenna systems and RF front cir-
cuitry. This unavoidably prevents the extraction of symmet-
ric cryptographic keys with low-bit mismatch rate. How-
ever, the channel response in different subcarriers should
be different due to diversified frequencies. The location and
time in which channel response measurements were taken
for a specific subcarrier also differ which can be argued as
a factor increasing key randomness. Authors in [33] added
that channel information at the receiver can be modelled
as a location-dependent variable with enough information
entropy to be utilised in key generation. However, if channel
response is measured in a short period of time highly
correlated estimates are generated in both transmitters. A
channel gain complement (CGC) algorithm was introduced
in an attempt to reduce the disparity of channel responses
[15]. The non-reciprocity components were identified with
the use of probe packets for each subcarrier. Authors have
recorded high bit mismatch rate when channel state infor-
mation is quantised in the time domain compared to the
frequency domain.
The randomness of signal envelope to share the secret
key between two parties has also been examined where
deep fades have been used to extract correlated bit strings
based on a theoretical analysis and simulation results only
[34], [22]*. Multiple antenna diversity has also been in-
vestigated for secret key extraction with limitations in the
key generation rate [35]. Authors* have argued that the
signal envelope can provide (to a pair of transceivers)
enough entropy required to extract a cryptographic key for
data exchange without the necessity to experience identical
signal envelops between transceivers. Although focus on
deep fades can partially overcome interference problems,
however, the quality of the symmetric key and the key
generation rate is low. Authors also limit their discussion
on the secure ways that key verification information can
be exchanged. They also hold assumptions that the size
of the bit streams between the two transceivers are the
same although calculated by different random sources. Also,
work in [34] proved to be computationally expensive when
it comes to key recovery phase that render the algorithm
difficult to be implemented in V2V communications. Their
fuzzy information reconciliation algorithm seems to remove
these constraints but the outcome is reduced entropy in
the overall quality of the key produced. Information rec-
onciliation is the process of correcting mismatch bits of the
quantisation phase by publicly exchanging information to
be used for corrective actions [36].
Quantisation and thresholding are the most important
processes in the key establishment process as they provide
initial information based on channel characteristics. Also,
these processes directly affect the bit mismatch probability
due to non-fully reciprocal but highly correlated channel
responses of Alice and Bob as a result of inherent com-
munication noise and transceivers hardware impairments.
The number of thresholds selected during quantisation also
presents a tradeoff between key generation rate and random
noise. Additional issues with fixed and multiple thresholds
were also reported such as susceptibility to active attacks
and discard of sampled values between thresholds respec-
tively [9]. Protection against active attacks has been partially
addressed in [6] with an Adaptive Secret bit Generation
4(ASBG) scheme. In this approach sampled values were
divided into blocks and each block has been independently
quantised using its own thresholds based on its average and
standard deviation. Although this work seem to improve
overall key generation does not account for imperfect chan-
nel reciprocity.
Specifically in V2V communications very high temporal
variability takes place due to the mobility of transmitter, re-
ceiver and surrounding scatterers. Though disadvantageous
for communication purposes, such temporal variability can
be readily exploited in the key generation process. Two dif-
ferent techniques have been introduced in [37] namely least
square thresholding and neural network-based error recon-
ciliation. Authors recorded an improvement in the detection
of fades with smaller depth in environments with no deep
fades (e.g., line-of-sight situations). The latter technique uses
two similar bit strings to generate keys of arbitrary length
known to both Alice and Bob. The security of this system
is based on the assumption that Eve cannot adequately
reverse the training process of the neural network. A low-
cost approach with regards to channel sampling effort was
introduced in [29]. The authors modelled mathematically
an adaptive channel probing approach based on Lempel-
Zin and proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller.
Adaptation of the probing rate showed improvements in
both the key generation rate and efficiency of the probing
process.
2.3 Privacy Amplification
The last step in the key generation process assumes that the
information extraction about the shared key used should
be computationally expensive to adversaries (privacy am-
plification). Most existing approaches focus on different
threat models and assumptions around level of access to the
channel. “Trapdoor” functions are used as a mean to assure
certain level of authentication and integrity in this process
[38]. These functions are also used as a mean to deduce
the size of the final key and amplify any errors if hashing
a reasonable copy of the key is attempted, to a degree
that even an exhaustive search of the key space would
be infeasible. This process is also used to account for any
information exposed during error reconciliation phase and
ensure that eavesdroppers do not gain significant advantage
to the point where they are able to reconstruct a significant
part of the key. In the next, we present an overview of the
most important error correction codes that can be potentially
used in the information reconciliation stage.
2.4 Error correction codes
Error reconciliation is the next step in the secret key gen-
eration process to correct miss-matched information due
to imperfect reciprocity and random noise in the channel.
Several error reconciliation algorithms have been intro-
duced with different tradeoffs between communication and
computational complexity and throughput error correction
capabilities (e.g. Cascade and Winnow). The Cascade error
reconciliation protocol assumes that two legitimate parties
agree on a random permutation over a public channel [39].
This random permutation takes place over their shifted keys
in an attempt to evenly distribute errors. Their shifted keys
are then divided in blocks where each block does not present
more than one error based on the error rate calculated [40].
Linear error correction codes known as Hamming codes
have been also introduced in the literature [41]. In order for
a sender to transmit a message with a Hamming code the
dot product of a generator matrix and the message must be
calculated (code word). The code word is then transmitted
at the receiver who computes the product of the code word
and the parity check matrix (syndrome). If the calculated
syndrome at the receiver is a zero vector, the message was
received without any errors. In Winnow protocol [42], the
operation is much similar with Cascade. The protocol also
suggests privacy maintenance throughout the whole recon-
ciliation phase as a mean to protect information exposed
during parity and syndrome exchanges.
Low Density Parity Codes (LDPC) are known for the
low density of their parity check matrices which linearly
increases the complexity of the decoding algorithm as the
length of the message increases [43]. In LDPC codes the
minimum distance (as in Hamming codes) and the decoding
algorithm used are considered essential parameters to their
performance. In their original form LDPC codes have fixed
number of 1’s in each column k and each row j along
with the block n, known as (n,j,k) low density code. The
original algorithm developed by Gallager to generate those
LDPC matrices was deemed insufficient for large key spaces
and limited to work only with regular codes (codes with
fixed number of 1’s in both columns and rows). LDPC can
be more efficient than Cascade as they can become rate
adaptive leading to more efficient interactive reconciliation
protocols [44], [45].
The invention of turbo codes (TCs) [46] was a revival
for the channel coding research community. Historical turbo
codes, also sometimes called Parallel Concatenated Convo-
lutional Codes (PCCCs), are based on a parallel concate-
nation of two Recursive Systematic Convolutional (RSC)
codes separated by an interleaver. They are called “turbo” in
reference to the analogy of their decoding principle with the
turbo principle of a turbo compressed engine, which reuses
the exhaust gas in order to improve efficiency.
The turbo decoding principle calls for an iterative al-
gorithm involving two component decoders exchanging
information in order to improve the error correction perfor-
mance with the decoding iterations. This iterative decoding
principle was soon applied to other concatenations of codes
separated by interleavers, such as Serial Concatenated Con-
volutional Codes (SCCCs) [47], [48], sometimes called serial
turbo codes, or concatenation of block codes, also named
block turbo codes [49], [50]. The near-capacity performance
of turbo codes and their suitability for practical implementa-
tion explain their adoption in various communication stan-
dards. In [51] the authors proposed utilizing Turbo codes for
reconciliation purposes. Further investigation in [52] show
that TCs are good candidates for reconciliation. The efficacy
of TCs with regards to their error correction capabilities in
various wireless communication standards is also recorded
in [53]. Further work in [24] demonstrate the improved
performance of TCs over Reed Solomon and CCs which are
the de-facto error correction codes used in 802.11p vehicular
networks. However, this work does not comprehensively
incorporate physical propagation characteristics such as 3D
5scattering and scatterers’ mobility which is addressed in this
work.
3 PERFORMANCE METRICS
As VANETs are inherently rapidly time-varying due to mul-
tipath propagation, this work parametrically models and
quantifies such temporal variability attributes and incor-
porates them into the key generation process. In addition,
violation of reciprocity due to hardware impairments or
other penalty factors will be compensated in the architec-
tural design and implementation. The proposed algorithmic
process will have to compensate for penalty factors influ-
encing the coherence region. The necessity for this work
stems from the research effort to further reduce bit mismatch
rate while maintaining high key generation rate in practical
VANET environments where mobility of the nodes and
large network scale imposes unique security challenges.
Three performance indicators namely, entropy, secret bit
extraction rate and bit mismatch rate, are discussed. The
later determines the rate at which the V2V channel is probed
in order to secure highly uncorrelated successive samples.
We thus present in the following the probing rate together
with the three performance indicators.
3.1 Probing Rate
The probing rate for both Alice and Bob FP = fPA = fPB
is considered the same for the purpose of channel esti-
mates collection. To achieve uncorrelated successive channel
probes, thus achieving highest entropy, successive probes
have to be taken in different coherence regions. Thus, we
must define FP ≤ vmax, where vmax is the maximum
Doppler frequency shift [14]. Considering single bounce of
multipath power onto mobile scatterers (e.g., other vehi-
cles), it is defined as [14]
vmax =
fc
c
(uTmax + uRmax + 2uSmax) (2)
where fc is the carrier frequency, c the speed of light in
free space and uTmax, uRmax and uSmax the maximum
velocities of transmitter, receiver and mobile scatterers, re-
spectively. In order to maximise the bit extraction rate, we
should investigate the feasibility of defining FP as equal to
vmax.
3.2 Entropy measures
The de-facto metric which quantifies the uncertainty is the
entropy of the generated bit string. The higher the entropy
the limited the ability to deduce a secret key established by
Eve due to larger uncertainty introduced. Entropy per bit i
is defined as [9]
Hi = −p0log2p0 − (1− p0)log2(1− p0) (3)
where p0 the probability of having zero and 1 − p0 = p1
the probability of having one. Ideally, we should have p0 =
p1 = 0.5. For independent bit sequences, the total entropy
is Htotal =
∑N
i=1Hi, where N is the total number of bits in
a sequence [54]. In an ideal case, Htotal = N bits.
3.3 Secret bit extraction rate
The rate is measured in terms of the final secret-bits ex-
tracted after error reconciliation and privacy amplification.
In practice the secret bit extraction rate depends on the
probing rate from Alice and Bob and the number of secret
bits per probing. The amount of secret bits extracted in a
time varying channel is influenced by the thresholding. Con-
sidering 0s and 1s to be generated with equal probabilities
(after proper thresholding) the secret bit extraction rate will
be Rk [16]
Rk = 2fP p(A = 1, B = 1) (4)
where p(A = 1, B = 1) is the joint probability of having 1
simultaneously at Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings. However, in
this paper we consider key generation rate as the number of
symmetric keys produced per unit time.
3.4 Bit mismatch Rate
Usually BMR will be measured as a ratio of the number of
bits that do not match between Alice and Bob to the number
of bits extracted at the thresholding stage often used as a
performance criterion for the quantisation process [9]. The
BMR is measured immediately after the thresholding stage
because a single mismatch in the bitstring can render the
secret key unusable. Bit mismatch rate differs from the bit
error rate in communication theory, which represents the
number of bits received in error. The two reasons for bit
mismatch are the unavoidable inherent noise in any wireless
communication link and the violation of reciprocity due to
hardware impairments. As violation of non-reciprocity is
compensated we are left with the inherent noise as a unique
problem. This noise will add uncertainty to the transmitted
bit strings given the received bit strings. Ideally, both bit
strings should have been identical. The bit mismatch proba-
bility can be described as follows [16]
PN = 1− (1− pe)N (5)
where pe will be the probability of a single erroneous bit
defined as [34]
pe = P (B = 0|A = 1) = P (B = 0, A = 1)
P (A = 1)
(6)
where P (B = 0|A = 1) is the conditional probability of
Bob’s bit being 0 when Alice’s is 1.
4 NON-RECIPROCITY COMPENSATION AND TC
RECONCILIATION IN VANET
The key generation process presented in Fig. 2 considers
for error reconciliation the method presented in [16] and
for a first time TCs in a V2V environment. However, the
input data in our case are generated synthetically in order
to comply with V2V propagation settings.
4.1 V2V channel model
The synthetic simulated Bob’s channel response is generated
by employing the Monte Carlo simulation method [55]. For
the V2V setting the theoretical channel model that needs to
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Fig. 2. Algorithmic process for combined TC and NR compensation
be simulated has been described in detail in [14]. Thus Bob’s
response in time domain is written as
GB(t) =
L∑
l=1
|αl|exp(jφl)exp(j2piult) (7)
The Doppler frequency ul is determined by
ul = vT,l + uS,l + uR,l (8)
where uT,l, uS,l and uR,l are the contributions due to Tx
mobility, scatterers’ mobility and Rx mobility, respectively.
The Doppler shift uT (R),l results from the departure (arrival)
of the lth multipath component from the mobile Tx (to the
mobile Rx). It is defined as [14]
uT (R),l = uT (R)maxcosβT (R),lcosαT (R),l (9)
where uT (R)max = vT (R)/λ, λ is the carrier wavelength,
uT (R) the the Tx (Rx) velocity, αT (R),l the azimuth angle of
departure (AOD) (angle of arrival (AOA)) and βT (R),l the
elevation AOD (AOA) with respect to the Tx (Rx) motion.
αT (R),l counts from the value −pi in the negative Y axis
returning to the same point in the clockwise direction and
βT (R),l is zero on the X-Y plane, pi/2 on the positive Z axis
and −pi/2 on the negative Z axis. Considering interaction of
the lth multipath component with a single mobile scatterer,
the Doppler shift vS,l will be [14]
uS,l = (vS,l/λ)(cosαl,l + cosα2,l) (10)
where vS,l is the scatterer’s velocity, αl,l the AOA and α2,l
the AOD with respect to scatterer’s motion.
The target is to appropriately model each factor affecting
the V2V channel response namely {|αl|}, {ul}, {φl}. In this
paper we consider a normalised (power equal to unity)
Rayleigh V2V channel with partially uniform 3D scattering
at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides with a Weibull distribution
of the mobile scatterers’ velocity. Rather than just a scenario
for demonstration, the partially 3D uniform scattering can
be further generalized to represent any multipath propaga-
tion scenario [56] whereas the Weibull distribution for the
multipath power contributed by mobile scatterers has been
proved a suitable modeling approach [57]. Thus the scatter-
ers velocity, which in fact models the power contributed by
mobile scatterers, is defined as
pus = wu
b−1
S exp(−wubS/b) (11)
where b ≤ 1 is the shape parameter and w the scale
parameter. The amplitudes |αl| are constant and phases
φi are uniformly distributed in [−pi, pi], i.e., |αl| =
√
2/L
and φl ∼ U [−pi, pi] [55]. Each Doppler contribution of
Eq. 7 has the following parameters need to be modelled:
azimuth angle of departure (AOD), angle of arrival (AOA)
αT (R),l ∼ U [AT (R)min, AT (R)max] elevation AOD (AOA)
βT (R),l ∼ U [BT (R)min, BT (R)max], AOA to mobile scatterer
α1,l ∼ U [−pi, pi], AOD to mobile scatterer α2,l ∼ U [−pi, pi],
power contributed by mobile scatterers uS ∼ pus(uS). The
symbolism U [., .] stands for the uniform distribution in
the designated interval. This scenario can approximate an
urban environment with other mobile vehicles and heavy
scattering.
In order to simulate a purely diffuse Rayleigh environ-
ment we need at least seven sum of sinusoids such as those
seen in Eq. (7) [58]. For simulation purposes, we define
L=20. The sampling/probing rate Fp = 1/Tcmin where
Tcmin = 1/vmax =
c
fc
/(uTmax + uRmax + 2uSmax) is
the minimum coherence in time and uTmax, uRmax, uSmax
are the maximum Doppler shifts due to mobile transmitter,
receiver, and scatterers respectively. In this way, we secure
that the channel is mostly probed in different coherence
regions, thus successive bits will be independent, resulting
keys with maximum entropy. Considering the maximum
velocity of transmitter, receiver and scatters to be 30m/s,
frequency of operation fc = 6GHz, the probing rate is
calculated as Fp = 2400 samples per second. We can further
reduce FP , as 1/Tcmin is in fact its upper bound, however
doing so, will reduce the key generation rate, resulting
marginal improvement in the key entropy. The latter is just
our perception and further research is required, however
it goes beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on
the applicability of TCs at the information reconciliation
stage and potential performance improvement. A possible
solution might be to adapt FP = 1/Tcmin to fit in changes
of the coherence region due to variations in the propaga-
tion conditions (e.g., more intense scatterers’ mobility, more
directional propagation, etc).
4.2 Algorithmic Process
Alice’s channel response would normally arise by simi-
lar channel probing rate in time instances such that hers
and Bob’s responses are taken within the same coherence
region. However, to further improve performance, Alice’s
7response GA(t) will arise after applying the non-reciprocity
compensation model presented in [15]. Thus considering M
estimates within the same coherence region between Alice
and Bob, their channel responses are related as [15]
GA(t)−GB(t) ∼ N(0, σ2) (12)
The variance is estimated by the discrepancy of Alice’s and
Bob’s estimates as follows
σ2 =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(GA,i(t)−GB,i(t)− µt)2 (13)
where
µt =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(GA,i(t)−GB,i(t)) (14)
This method was presented in [16] where Alice and Bob
determine samples from channel estimates above and below
an upper and lower threshold discarding those in between,
i.e., lossy thresholding. We use this approach to compare
it against our TC correction process presented in Figure
2. Those estimates are samples in a form of an excursion.
The quantisation process creates segments of those samples
(also referred as excursions) of succesive bit values of 1s
and 0s. Each of those segments are created whenever a
channel probe returns a reading that does not fall inside
the thresholds. Alice selects a random set of these segments
and sends to Bob the index of the channel estimate lying in
the center of the segment defined as icenter = b istart+iend2 c
as a list La. The number of channel estimates are modelled
in the simulation and the total size for each segment has
been setup to m = 5 successive estimates that fall out-
side the thresholds (acceptable estimates). However, m is
a configurable parameter of the algorithm that combined
with the quantisation process affects the tradeoff between
key generation rate and bit miss-match probability. Indeed
a larger value of m reduces the number of secret bits that
can be generated per second. Following implementation and
testing in [16], we define m = 5. For each index from Alice,
Bob checks his segments and verifies his samples centered
around that index above or below the thresholds q−, q+
matched with Alice and generates a new list of those indices
Lb ≤ La. Bob sends Lb over to Alice. Both Alice and Bob
quantise their channel estimates at each index of Lb in order
to generate the bit-string. Thus, this method simultaneously
accomplishes thresholding and information reconciliation.
4.3 Results and discussion
Part of the algorithmic operation is to develop an optimi-
sation sub-routine to adaptively change the threshold as
a function of the temporal variability of the channel. The
optimisation routine will consider several attributes such
as multi-clustered three dimensional scattering, specular-
reflected multipath components, multiple bounces on mo-
bile objects in dense propagation environments. Threshold
selection has to be adopted dynamically to the tempo-
ral variations induced by the aforementioned effects. The
thresholds should be refreshed after a specific amount of
time over which the stationarity region has been crossed.
We anticipate the refresh to take place every 10 coherence
regions due to the inherent non-stationarity of the V2V
channel [14]. An alternative way to refresh the thresholding
process could be to consider a Doppler spectrum correla-
tion criterion. More specifically, considering the normalised
Doppler spectrum as a probability distribution of Doppler
frequencies, the Doppler correlation coefficient will be de-
fined as
ρ(X,Y ) =
cov(X,Y )
σXσY
(15)
where cov(X,Y ) is the covariance of the X,Y normalised
Doppler spectra and σX , σY are the standard deviations
of X, Y, respectively. When the correlation coefficient falls
below a specified threshold (e.g.,) the quantisation and
thresholding process will be refreshed. The first phase of
the routine developed is the construction of the Synthetic
data which will be generated via Monte Carlo simulation
taking into account the number of multiple components, the
sampling rate and total number of samples. In the next stage
the probed received envelopes are generated considering an
appropriately defined probing rate in order to maximize
the entropy in the subsequent quantisation step. From the
received data, the transmitted data are modelled by con-
sidering non-reciprocity compensation. At this stage a lossy
quantisation process is preferred due to its computational
simplicity. The target is to end up with a maximum secret
bit extraction rate and entropy. For that purpose, in the
following step several runs should take place considering
the thresholds multiple pairs. A feasibility study of both
lossless and lossy quantisation processes and their applica-
bility in V-V scenarios is an area for further investigation.
We consider the transmission scenario between Alice and
Bob. The transmitter’s samples are modelled by adopting
a channel gain complement technique which compensates
channel non-reciprocity. This is done by adding a zero mean
Gaussian variability to the receivers samples. Thus, the
input information sequence in the TC represents the gen-
erated key for Bob, while the output of the AWGN channel
after turbo encoding designates the generated key for Alice.
Then, turbo decoding is performed and the performance of
the reconciliation method can be evaluated by measuring
the Bit Error Rate and the key generation rate.
Bob’s generated sequence after quantization is fed to the
input of a TC. During this process a single threshold is
adopted as a lossless quantisation scheme with the potential
to substantially increase the key generation rate [34]. The
threshold adopted in our work is static and equal to 1.
However, an adaptive quantisation process related to the
channel temporal variability that updates the threshold at
each stage is currently investigated. Turbo decoding is then
performed in order to generate a symmetric output, i.e.
symmetric keys for Alice and Bob. Increasing the number of
decoding iterations in TCs reduces the bit error rate, thus,
improving the bit miss-match rate between Alice and Bob.
Furthermore, it would result to an increased key generation
rate at the expense of added computational complexity as
part of the turbo decoding process. In our algorithm, TCs
are simulated with a single iteration. Performance of the
reconciliation method can be evaluated by measuring the
BMR and to the Bit Error Rate (BER) in our case. The
comparison is made against the sample indexing technique
8TABLE 1
TC simulation results in secret key generation
Key Length
(bits)
KGR (with
TCs)
KGR (with In-
dexing [16])
128 35
keys/min
3 to 7 keys/min
256 17
keys/min
2 to 5 keys/min
512 8 keys/min 1 to 2 keys/min
TABLE 2
Comparison of BMR with existing RSS-Based approaches
Scheme Design Approach BMR
Patwari et al. [59] RSS-based 0.482
Jana et al. [18] 0 ∼ 0.55
Premnath et al. [6] 0.02 ∼ 0.24
Croft et al. [60] 0.01 ∼ 0.07
Zan et al. [7] 0.005 ∼ 0.02
Mathur et al. [16] 0.22
Non-reciprocity compensation
with TC (Our approach) 0.02
already applied in our algorithm as discussed in subsection
4.2. We measure the efficiency and efficacy of our algorithm
against widely adopted metrics namely entropy, bit miss-
match rate, probing rate and key generation rate. We cal-
culated BMR for the indexing method by considering the
discarded indexes after Alice’s and Bob’s channel probing.
In Table 1 we compute the key generation rate for different
key lengths. Compared to the samples’ indexing method
in [9], there was a significant improvement on both BMR
and key generation rate. The simulated BER to generate a
symmetric shared key between Alice and Bob after error
reconciliation is estimated to only 0.0752 using TCs. Further-
more, the BMR with single thresholding is only 0.02 whereas
the estimated BMR with the indexing technique is around
0.22 in both cases of static and mobile scatterers. The key
generation rate was also reported high considering different
key lengths requested. For instance, the secret key rate to
generate the 128-bit symmetric key is 35 good keys per
minute with TCs while it varies from 3 to 7 symmetric keys
per minute with the indexing technique. As shown in Table
1, simulations proved similar improvements for different
key lengths as part of the error reconciliation process. Satis-
factory entropy values were obtained throughout all rounds
of simulation during the key extraction process ranging
from 0, 85 ∼ 0, 97 bits per sample. Note that the BMR with
the indexing technique is nearly the same for different key
lengths which is coherent with the uniform method used by
the authors. In Table 2, we present a comparison between
the BMR achieved in our approach with existing RSS-based
approaches published in the literature.
5 CONCLUSION
We successfully combined non-reciprocity compensation
and TCs for information reconciliation as the most impor-
tant features in V2V communication including 3D scatter-
ing and scatterers’ mobility. Findings from our evaluations
indicated significant improvements were achieved in key
generation rate with reduced BMR when TCs are employed
against an existing indexing method. Our proposed tech-
nique can be used to secure communications between ve-
hicular nodes in an ad hoc social IoT network, and this
has applications in both civilian and adversarial / military
context (e.g. Internet of Military and Battlefield Things).
Future studies include the investigation of TCs for error
conciliation purposes especially in the context of social IoT
networks. For example, we will focus on several parameters
that affect performance of TCs such as component decod-
ing algorithms, number of decoding iterations, generator
polynomials, constraint lengths of the component encoders
and the interleaver type. Increasing the number of iterations
in the TC can significantly improve the BER, thus gener-
ating more symmetric keys. Furthermore, we are working
towards the single thresholding process by creating a dy-
namic threshold that is updated according to the receiver’s
samples.
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